The book details his work over the past 20 years. Kennedy was an architect of the Boston miracle in the early-mid '90's and their Ten Point Coalition. This was one of the first large-scale, multi-agency, multi-jurisdiction efforts to combat urban violence primarily through gang intervention via communication. Kennedy's work asks questions about deterrence. Do rational threats of punishment affect decisions of gang members? If not, why not? If not, can this be changed? In Trenton, prison was seen as a rite of passage to some; the threat of prison was not a deterrent, for gang members it was more like an occupational hazard. Kennedy and some others were able to cobble together a group of officials and agencies (including churches and non-profits) to examine a rash of gang-related homicides in Boston. They found out that there was a small group of hyper-violent offenders that were driving much of the violence. Law enforcement went after these guys, locked them up and made an example out of them to the others. In doing so, Kennedy's group soon learned that the gang members and affiliates preferred other options to criminal endeavors. In many cases, gang members joined gangs for protection, seeing this as the only means for survival, even though the dangers associated with gang membership reduced life expectancy significantly.
The breakthrough, following getting all the various agencies and their agendas unified, was in holding meetings with gang members. The Kennedy group (my phrase, not his) targeted a neighborhood in Boston that had a particular problem. They rounded up the worst offenders, those drivers of violence. They contacted other gang members, inviting them to attend a community meeting with law enforcement et al. The authorities assured the gang members that no one would be arrested at the community meeting; the gang members could bring a family member or someone they trusted with them. On the surface, this tactic might seem D.O.A. but it worked with a participation rate above 75%. At the meeting, the authorities communicated the message that the violence had to stop immediately. They laid out specific consequences if it did not; here, the presence of state and federal prosecutors was most important. They also laid out other options for the gang members and had social services present to begin finding housing, jobs, GED classes, etc. for those interested.
Aside from communicating deterrence in very clear, specific ways, these meetings broke down the perceived barrier between law enforcement and the at-risk community. Although law enforcement is to protect and serve, they are perceived as antagonists and against the community in many urban areas. The gangs are not loved in those communities either but some residents express in the book that they feel victimized by both law enforcement and the gangs.
Kennedy delves into the other side of the equation, noting that authorities have a difficult time understanding how a community can tolerate gangs. The code of silence within a neighborhood after a crime is pervasive (in Trenton a children's adage was 'snitches get stitches'). In some ways, law enforcement had an underlying, sub-conscious feeling of just desserts when a community had a gang problem.
Kennedy was able to breakdown both sides of this dysfunction. And his process worked. He sought to replicate it in Indianapolis, High Point, NC, and other cities. Every place that they followed his methods realized crime relief. However, when his work was not maintained, meaning consistent communication of punishment with exact follow through coupled with alternatives, the crime returned.
The book details Kennedy's frustrations not with gangs--he solved this riddle effectively and could reproduce those results given certain criteria--but with egotistic and turf-driven bureaucrats. The gangs in the suits and ties, with the degrees and titles were the ones that gave him the most trouble. Many preferred more aggressive, made for tv police interdiction to the community meetings. In an era of zero tolerance and mandatory sentences, when each politician must appear tough on crime, Kennedy's methods, though cost effective and societally effective, appeared soft.
Martin O'Malley, now Governor of Maryland, is singled out particularly for gutting an effective program Kennedy put together in Baltimore (he's from that area) in favor of more dramatic policing. However, under O'Malley's tenure in Baltimore, crime increased noticeably as did the policing portion of the city budget.
I actually had a pilot program set up to launch in Trenton, in the Goat Hill section of the south ward, that would have followed this. I had the local community and the Trenton Police Director on board; we were within a few months of launching when I got the call to Waco. It never moved forward but there are some Trentonians studying Kennedy's work in hopes of reproducing it there.
In some ways, the book allows Kennedy some self-therapy. His frustration at the civil side of the equation is palpable, almost moving to an indictment of authorities for their obstinacy at dealing with urban violence (murder, drugs, domestic violence) through effective means. Despite some setbacks, Kennedy presents a model for community betterment and empowerment that works and will travel.
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